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ABSTRACT
We present a new methodology for ranking business schools. Unlike previous rankings
based on subjective survey responses (from CEOs, business school deans, recruiters, or
graduates), our approach uses data derived from the labor market for new MB As. We adjust
programs' salaries for the quality of entering students in an attempt to distinguish value added
from the quality of incoming students. We then rank programs according to value added. Our
results are rather surprising. While four of our top five programs are also labelled as top
programs in other rankings, ten of our top twenty are previously unranked. By emphasizing
program value added, our procedure identifies several programs that have been overlooked by
other rankings since they do not recruit the very top students. We explore the determinants of
our value added and student quality measures and find that connections to the business
community are positively related to value added, while academic research and high faculty
salaries are more stongly associated with student quality. We also find that tuition is better
explained by our measure of value added than raw salary, suggesting that programs charge
according to value added.
Joseph Tracy Joel Waldfogel
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Columbia University Yale University
International Affairs Building New Haven, CF 06520
420W. 118th Street and NBER
New York, NY 10027The past few decades have witnessed tremendous growth in the trainingof MBAs.The
number of MBAs awarded annually has risen from 5,000 in 1960 to more than 70,000 in 1989.'
Over 650schools in thecountry now offer an MBA degree. Demographic changes suggest that this
enrollment growth will not continue in the future.2 Sensing a shakeout coming in the decade ahead,
business schools are strenuously competing to achieve or maintain top rankings as means of survival.
This has necessarily fbcused attention on the process of ranking business schools.
Previous rankings of business schools have been constructed using a variety of sources and
methods. Rankings have been based on interviews with CEOs, business school deans, recruiters, and
graduates. In 1986, Business Week (BW) published a ranking based on interviews with 486 top
executives. In 1987, U.S.News& World Report published a ranking based on interviews with 131
deans. Jn 1988, BW published a widely publicized ranking reflecting both the views of recruiters and
business school graduates. These rankings differ significantly because of the differing criteria used by
each constituent group to evaluate business programs.
In this paper, we present a new methodology for ranking business schools. Unlike previous
rankings, our approach does not use subjective responses from various constituent groups. Rather, we
use data derived from the labor market for MBAs.5 Our approach can be viewed as a modification
of the simple method of ranking by average starting salary. We standardize salaries for the quality of
the students entering each program in an attempt to isolate the program's value added. A basic goal
of our paper is to distinguish the quality of the program from the quality of its incoming students.
Our results are rather surprising. While four out of our top five programs are also labelled as top
programs in other rankings, ten out of our top twenty program are previously unranked. By
1See p. 93, Porter and McKibbin (1988) and Barrons (1990).
2See Byrne (1993), chapter 1.
3To use a sports analogy, each year there is considerable interest in which college football teani is
the best in the country. The current method of resolving this issue is through polls by sports writers.
An alternative which is often suggested is a ranking based on a post season tournament. We view the
labor market for MBAs as the playing field where business programs compete, and use this rather than
taking polls of deans (coaches), recruiters (scouts), or players (graduates).emphasizing programvalueadded,our procedure identifies several programs that have been
overlookedby other rankings since they do not recruitthevery top students.
Wemake severalothercontributions to the school ranking debate.First,we take the study of
MBA rankings a step furtherbyexamining the detenninants of a school's ranking. For example, how
essential are academicresearch, faculty salaries, and alumni networks to a program's success? We
presentregression results whichassess the contributions of various characteristiós of business
programsto a school's ranking. Second, we test our measure of value added by asking whether it -
orstarting salary of graduates -better explains tuition. Finally, because our evaluation is a by-
product ofstatistical estimation, we canreport measuresof precision for ourrankings. Through
simulation we determine the frequency thataschoolis rankedin the top5 and top20.Thisallows us
to report confidence intervals for these classifications.
1. BusIness School Data
Data for this study come primarily from a survey conducted by the authors. Our survey, sent
to deans at 85 business schools, requested information about the MBA class of l991. We sought
information about students' backgrounds, their immediate post-MBA job placement, and the
characteristics of the MBA programs. We received 49 responses for an overall response rate of 58
percent. although response rates vary significantly across requested data items. Relevant survey
information on student backgrounds included GMAT (43 responses), undergraduate (WA (43),percent
of students with advanced degrees prior to business school (30), percent with full-time work
experience of greater than a year (43). We also asked about the number of applications (38) and
acceptances (34) and nonresident tuition (42).
4We chose programs two ways. First, we selectedprograms designated as 'top' programs in the
business press, e.g. Byrne (1991), Stuart and Stuart (1990). Second, we included the major state school
in most states lacking a top program.
2Requested placement information included mean starting salaries, as well as the distributions
of placements by occupation (finance, marketing, consulting, operations, accounting, general
management, and other), by industry (manufacturing, services and nonprofit), and by region (by ur
census regions and foreign and by major cities, see below). We supplemented our survey using the
secondary sources listed in appendix Al. The data set we ultimately use for analysis covers 63 MBA
programs.5 Summary statistics are provided in Table Al.
2. Measuring Value Added
Two principles guide our ranking procedure. The first principle is that rankings should be
based on measurable criteria that are comparable across programs. BW's widely cited rankings fail to
meetthisinnocuous-sounding criterion. Their rankings are based in part on a survey of graduates in
which respondents rate their own programs on a scale from 1-10 according to 30 criteria. As an
example, question I asks: "To what extent did your MBA experience fulfill or fail to meet your
expectations of what a good program should be?' The reply to this question will be comparable
across programs only if each program's students have, on average, identical expectations. This would
arise, for example, if students were allocated randomly to MBA programs; but, this clearly is not the
case. Expectations and other student characteristics vary across programs making graduate ratings of
their own MBA experiences incomparable.
The second principle is that rankings should be based on 'outputs' rather than 'inputs."6 A
difficulty in devising a ranking system is the lack of consensus on what business programs should be
producing. In this paper, we focus on the degree to which business programs are successful in
5We have mean starting salary data on 63 programs. Of these 63 programs, we are missing one
program's GMAT. we are missing the percent of students with advanced degrees for two programs, and
we are missing the selectivity variable (the ratio of acceptances to applications) for two programs. Rather
than lose these observations, we impute the missing values by regressing each of the five explanatory
variables in Table 2 on the other four, then solving for the missing values.
6This distinction can be difficult to make in practice. For example, academic research can be viewed
as an output of a business program as welt as an input into the training process of MBA students.
3producing high-salary jobsfor their graduates. Given a competitive labor marketforMBAs,salaries
will reflect the willingness of employers to pay for the attributes embodied in a program's
graduates.7 A program which attracts high quality students may generate high salaries for its
graduates without adding value to them. To isolate a program's value added to the students, we
standardize the salary data ftr the quality of the program's incoming students.8
2.1AdJustingSalary by Region, Occupation and Industry
Reported salary figures reflect regional differencesin cost-of-livingas well as wage
differentisis basedon occupation and industry(includingwhether the job is in the non-profit sector).
Tomake our salarydatacomparableacross programs,we adjust starting salariesusing school-specific
deflators whichreflecteachschool'sregional and occupation/industry placementcomposition.
Tocontrol for regional cost-of-living differentials, we use the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) intermediate income urban cost-of-living budget data (BLS 1982). These data indicate thecost
of purchasing a common basket of goods across twenty-four majormetropolitan areas, as well as an
overall urban area average. We delete from the budget amount thecomponent due to personal income
taxes. The resulting budget figures are normalized by the overall urbanaverage to yield an index
value for each city.
We compute four regional index values using the population-weightedaverage of the indices
for the cities in each region. The BLS last producedbudget data for 1981. We update the index to
1990 using the CPIUrbanWage Earner index (1982-1984=100) (81.5 1991). This index gives the
current cost-of-living in each of these cities relative to the base period. Wecompute school-specific
7We acknowledge that starting salariesare an imperfect measure of the labor market performance of
a progranfs graduates. No infbrmation is provided on the growthrate of earnings on the job or on the
expected job duration. Data limitations, however, prevent us frontusing a measure of the present value
of career earnings.
8The methodology we use is similar to that used in theurban economics literature to construct quality
of life indices fir metropolitan areas. See forexample Rosen (1979), Robaclc (1982). and Gyourko &
Tracy (1991). The issue of cream-slcimming" arises inmany other contexts. See Cragg (1993) for an
application to performance evaluation in the government jobtraining programs.
4cost-of-living indices using the city and regional distribution of their graduates' placement. The index
is calculated as a placement-weighted average of the city and regional cost-of-living indices. The
resulting regional salary deflators vary between a low of 0.91 and a high of 1.13.
Business schoolsalso differ in the occupations and industries chosen by their graduates. Some
programs send a substantial fraction of their graduates to work in high-paying consulting firms, while
other programs place a substantial fraction of graduates in low-paying nonprofit institutions. Whether
we should adjust a program's average salary for occupation and industry depends on the determinants
of the occupation/industry salarystructurefor MBAs. lithe salary structure reflects ability and skill
differences of the MBAs hired into each field, then MBA graduates choosing high-salary
occupations/industries would have earned high salaries regardless of their choice. In this case, we
should not adjust salaries for occupation and industry. On the other hand, salary differentials may
reflect compensation for job attributes such as stress and average hours that systematically vary across
jobsindifferent occupations and industries, in this case, we need to adjust the average starting
salaries for each school's occupational/industry placement composition.9
Identifying the extent to which the MBA salary structure reflects compensating wage
differentials would require data on job attributes for MBA jobs disaggregated by occupation and
industry. We do not have such data. In light of this, the best we can do is to estimate
occupation/industry wage differentials adjusting for self-selection based on the observed ability of the
MBAs. To do this requires micro data on MBAs which identifies the individual characteristics that
we use to predict student quality.
We obtained five years of data from a leading business school on starting salary, occupation,
industry, GMAT, age, prior work experience, and gender. Using this data we regress each MBA
graduate's starting salary on a set of individual characteristics, class year indicators, and
occupation/industry indicators. The results, in Table A2, provide some evidence on whether selection
on observed ability affects the occupation/industry salary structure for MBAs. The regression in
9See Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1987), and Murphy and Topel (1987) for a
discussion of the determinants of the overall occupation/industry wage structure in the U.S..
5column (I)includesobservable measures of ability while the regression in column (2) omits these
controls. The resulting occupation/industry wage diffrrentials are virtually identical in the two
specifications.'0 Our data suggest that self-selection based on observed ability is not prominent in
the MBA labor market. However, the occupation/industry wage differentials estimated in
specification (1) may still be biased from selection on unobserved ability. Addressing this issue would
require panel data which fbllows MBA graduates through their future job changes, data which are
unavailable.
These results suggest that occupation/industry salary differentials depend primarily on job,
rather than student, characteristics. Hence, we use the estimated occupation/industry wage
differentials from specification (I) of Table A2 and each school's occupation/industry placement
profile to construct school-specific occupation/industry deflators. We combine the regional and
occupation/industry deflators into an overall salary deflator which we use to adjust starting salaries
across programs. Table I gives the top 20 schools in our sample sorted by adjusted average starting
salary. In addition, we list the unadjusted starting salaries and the salary deflators. The adjusted
salary distribution is more compressed than the unadjusted salary distribution. The standard deviation
of adjusted salary is $8,476 while the standard deviation of unadjusted salary is $10,511.
2.2 AdjustIng lot Student Quality
We now turn to standardizing the output measure (adjusted salary) for the quality of inputs
(incoming students). Our approach is to weight a variety of student characteristics into a single index
ol' student quality. After identifying a set of characteristics which reflect underlying studentquality
differences, we assign relative weights again appealing to the labor market. We weight each
characteristic using its coefficient from a regression of adjusted average starting salary onaverage
10'Fhe Chi-square test for the equality of theoccupation/industry wage differentials in the two












































































17student characteristics. Our resulting measure of "student quality" is the fitted value from this salary
regression, whileour measureof a school's "value added" is the residual from this regression.11
Theregression used to construct our student quality index is given in specification (2) of Table
2. Summary statistics and information on sources are given in Table Al. The two most important
student quality variables are the average GMAT and the percent of students with at least a year of
full-time work experience. The marginal effect for GMAT turns positive at a score of 546, which is
slightly above the minimum score observed in our sample. Business programs whose students score
higher on the GMAT and who have more prior work experience have significantly higher starting
salaries upon graduation, and are therefore better inputs into the MBA training process. Figure 1
provides simple plots of our adjusted starting salary measure and the GMAT and work experience for
each school in our sample. Each of these determinants is clearly positively correlated with adjusted
salary.
The three other coefficients reported in the specification (I) of the quality regression have the
expected sign but are not precisely measured. Controlling for the average GMAT score of the
incoming class, an increase in the average undergraduate grade point average has a positive but
imprecisely measured effect on starting salaries. The adjusted salary - and, we infer, quality of the
incoming students - is higher when a greater fraction enter with a graduate degree. Finally, the
quality of the incoming students may be higher as a result of a wide applicant pool from which to
select)2 This is supported by the negative coefficient on the schools' ratio ofacceptances to
applications. We construct our student quality and value added measures using the fitted values and
residuals from specification (2), which omits the insignificant variables.
For a similar analysis of the determinants of theaverage starting salaries of lawyers see Table I of
Ehrenberg (1989).
t2Admissions offices have more information available to them on which to base their decisions than
is reflected in the variables reported in Table 2. If onaverage this information is useful for screening out
the less qualified candidates, then average qualityamong the admitted students should be increasing in the
selectivity of the admissions process.




















Undergratuate grade pointaverage 2,281.78
(6,655.90)
Percent witha graduate degree 35.73
(179.27)
Ratio of acceptances toapplications -16.13
(65.86)
Number of Observations 63 63
k-square 0.565 0.563
Notes: Standard errorsaregiven in parentheses. We measure student quality (value added) using
thefined values (residuals) from specification (2).Figure 1: ScatterPlotsof Adjusted Salary and Student Characteristics
Notes: The axis of
respective variable
each plot are given by reading up and
labels.








































660 31091,1 71B 16.22.3 Is Our Value Added Measure Reasonable?
Our measure of value added,theresidual from the adjusted salaryregression,provides a
measureofhow unexpectedly high-or low - a program's adjustedstartingsalaryis,given the
observed characteristicsof its incoming students. We interpret this residual as the relative
enhancement of starting salaries that is induced by the business program itself. This interpretation
attributes all differences in salary, conditional on student characteristics, to differences across
programs in value added. Alternatively, residual post-MBA salary differences may reflect residual
pre-MBA salary differences. That is. our measure of value added may be biased due to the
nonrandom assignment of students to business programs conditional on observed characteristics in our
data which results from the admissions process.
A program's adjusted salary might be high, given its students' average GMATs and work
experience, because business programs may admit candidates on the basis of characteristics which lead
to high starting salaries, and are observed to the admissions office but unobserved in our data. For
example, some programs may interview candidates and select those with charisma. If charisma
enhances salaries, then such programs' adjusted salaries will reflect not only value added by the MBA
program but also screening by the admissions office.13 As a result, our value added measure, the
post-MBA salary residual, will partly reflect pre-MBA unobserved salary heterogeneity in addition to
value added by the program,
The natural approach to this problem is to measure a program's value added by comparing
students' pre- and post-MBA salaries. Limited longitudinal data allow us to explore this method. We
have pre- and post-MBA salary data for 35 schools which we can use to calculate the change in
salary, Isy= y,,,,- Theuse of 4y as a measure of program value added would be valid if
t3Our inclusion of an admissions selectivity variables partially avoids this problem, but the problem
may linger given the inherent difficulty of measuring selectivity across different self-selected applicant
pools.
t4Pre and post-MBA salary data for the class of 1992 are from Byrne (1993), No information is
available to adjust the pre-MBA salary for regional and industryfoccupational differences in admission
profiles. Consequently, we use unadjusted pre- and post-MBA average salaries in the analysis.
8there werenocomplementarities betweenstudentquality andprogramquality in the production of
business education.
To explorethis issue we estimated thefoltowing regression:
-
ye,, + , where X containsthe student characteristics usedabove to explain the level of
post-MBA salary. Here, 3(8 is intended to capture the degree of complementarity in the business
education production function while i is the component of the change in salary that is independent of
student characteristics.15 Werejectthehypothesisthat6 =0(for instance, students at programs
withhigher average GMATs experience higher average salary growth). For this reason, we prefer 17
over Esy as a measure of program value added derived from the longitudinal data.
How similar are the rankings resulting from ij and thepost-MBAresidual, when both
are calculated front the same longitudinal salary data? Figure 2 plots 17 against Cr,,,. The two
measures are highly correlated (0.88), and the resulting rankings are very similar. Appendix Table
A4presents thetop 20 business schools (of the 35 programs for which pre- and post-MBA salary data
are available) based on the post-MBAsalaryresidual e41,0,, and based on ,. We conclude from this
evidence that the rankings resulting from our approach are not driven by the mistaken attribution of
unobserved differences in pre-MBA salary to our value added measure.
2.4 Student Quality RankIngs
Table 3 presents the top twenty schools in our sample sorted by our measure of student quality
(the fitted value from a regression of adjusted salary on student characteristics). Our estimates
indicate that Yale's School of Management attracts the best students)6 Fifteen of thetop 20 schools
t5Note that ij is arithmetically identical to the difference between thepost- and the pre-MEA salary
residuals. If we estimate yr,,, = x$,0,, + e,0,, andYpre = 3(flpre + pre' then 6 = ,0,, - fl,,. and =
pofl — ¶pre'
'6llarvard does not require the GMAT in its application. As a result, Harvard doesnot report an
average GMAT score for its students. To keep Harvard in the sample, we used a GMAT score


















Figure 2: Comparison of AlternativeValue Added Measures
0
Post-MBA Salary Pesiduaj























Yale University NA 19 1
(0.0)
Universityof Pennsylvania 2 3 2
(0.1)
MIT II 9 3
(0.2)
Stanford University 5 1 4
(0.1)
Harvard University 3 2 5
(0.0)
Dartmouth College 6 14 6
(0.1)
UC- LosAngeles 10 17 7
(0.2)
Cornell University 16 II 8
(0.1)
ColumbiaUniversity 8 7 9
(0.2)
University of Virginia 1 6 10
(0.5)
NorthwesternUniversity 14 5 II
(0.8)
UC-Berkeley 19 12 12
(1.3)
University of Chicago 4 4 13
(0.5)
Duke University 13 8 14
(0.6)
University ofWashington NA 49 15
(0.5)
NewYork University 17 18 16
(1.4)
Rice University NA 16 17
(1.6)
University of North Carolina 12 13 18
(1.4)
University ofMinnesota NA 42 19
(1.4)
Georgetown University NA 31 20
__________________________________________ -(0.7)
Notes: Student qualityismeasured as the fitted value from the regression in specification
(?)of Table 1. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are based on 100,000
simulations.based on student quality were ranked in BW's top 20. Not surprisingly, 17 of these schools were also
in thetop20 basedonadjusted salary.
The student quality ranking is based on estimation. Sampling variation in the underlying
regression coefficients will produce variation in the resulting rankings. Thus, we can compute
measures of precision associated with each rank. The standard deviation of a school's rank was
estimated using simulation methods. We generate new coefficient estimates using the estimated
distribution of the coefficients derived from our quality regression. For each new set of coefficients,
we recalculate the ranking. We replicate this process 100,000 times, which produces a distribution of
ranks for each school. The standard deviation of this distribution is reported in the table.
3. Top Business Schools
We are now ready to present our value added rankings of the top business schools. Recall,
we measure each school's value added using the school's residual from the adjusted salary regression
reported in specification (2) of Table 2, Table 4 presents the top twenty business schools based on
our methodology. Stanford University ranks highest, while Harvard, Chicago, Virginia, and Wharton
round out the top five. Except for Virginia, each of these schools was also in the top 5 of the BW
ranking.
Our methodology produces some surprises of inclusion in, and exclusion from, the top twenty.
For example, Dartmouth, Columbia, and UCLA are all in the SW top 10, yet do not appear in our
top 20. These schools rank very high on our student quality measure, but do not produce
commensurately high starting salaries. Consequently, our methodology assigns a low value added to
these programs. In contrast, Oklahoma State, New Mexico, and Wake Forest are in our top 10, but
are not in the BW top 20. These schools are in the opposite situation; their graduates earn moderately
high starting salaries despite having relatively modest student characteristics. The appearance of such
different programs in our top 20 highlights the difference between our value added approach and the




























































































































Abies: Value added is measured as the residual from the regression in specification
are given in parentheses. The standard errors and percent topS and top 20 are based on 100.000 simulations. The full
set of rankings are available upon request from the authors.
(2) of Table I. The standard errorstraditional rankings. In particular, our results suggest that existing rankings implicitly assign a large
weight to the qualityof students when evaluating the qualityof the programs themselves.
Table 4 also reports two columns indicating the percentage of times in 100,000replications
that a school is in the top 5 and top 20. This allows us to calculate confidence intervals for these two
classiflcations. For example, three (fourteen) schools are in the top 5(20)in at least 90% of the
simulations. In contrast, eight (twenty seven) schools are in the top 5 (20) in at least 10% of the
simulations.
Two observations are in order. First, it is important to recognize that the value added
estimates, and associated rankings, are based on the current allocation of students to programs. Thus,
our rankings should be understood to reflect the value added currently conveyed to the students at
each of the programs, not the value added that would unconditionally be transmitted to any students at
these programs. Second, while the ranking of any particular program can be distorted by
measurement error (particularly in salary), the overall pattern of rankings, with traditional top schools
near the top and less well-known programs completing the top 20, is not driven by measurement
error.
4. Determinants of Program Quality
Previous approaches to ranking business programs do not attempt to determine the factors
contributing to their overall ranking. Yet, this is an important matter for investigation. Deans are
continually faced with decisions affecting the scope and content of their programs, and the effect of
these decisions on the performance of the programs is relevant to these decisions. We investigate this
issue by examining the relationship between schools' value added and a set of program characteristics,
including the quality of the alumni network, faculty research quality, and faculty salary. Data
availability limits the extent to which we can explore other program characteristics.
To explore the determinants of program quality, we regress our measure of value added on
program characteristics. There are two qualification to keep in mind as we proceed. First, given the
complementarities between student and program characteristics that we demonstrated earlier, there is
11no unique decomposition of starting salary into student quality and value added. Second, we have
adopted a two-step estimation strategy in which we first regress starting salary on student
characteristics, and then we regress the salary residual (value added) on program characteristics. If
student and program characteristics were orthogonal in the data, then this two-step procedure would
produce the same coefficients as a pooled estimation. The data, though, reject this orthogonality.17
While the two procedures are statistically distinct, meaningful differences do not exist. The rankings
produced by both methods are virtually the same and the qualitative findings are identical)5 We
prefer the two-step procedure for its methodological simplicity.
The first program characteristic we include is a measure of each school's alumni network.
Specifically, we calculated the number of Business Week 1000 firms with CEOs from each business
program)9 Schools with more connections to top firms, as measured by the training of their CEOs,
may have an advantage in placing their recent graduates. Alternatively, this variable may simply
measure current success in terms of past success. Harvard is a outlier according to this measure with
79 CEOs to its credit. Stanford ranks second with 23 CEOs. We present these regressions with and
without Harvard in the sample to check for robustness of the results.
We control for two characteristics of the business school's faculty. The first is a proxy for
the research intensity of the faculty. Unfortunately, we do not have any direct measure of research
intensity for all of the schools in our sample. What we can measure is the research output of the
economics department in the same university. Limited available evidence indicates that this is as an
'7The specification test for the equality of the coefficients on the student quality variables estimated
with and without the program characteristics results in a chi-square statistic of 20.4, which is highly
significant.
18Let X represent the students characteristics used above in the adjusted salary regression. Z represent
the program characteristics, and Y our adjusted salary data. If we regress YonX and Z. then the
residual e = Y - X $ produces virtually the same ranking as used above.
19See Roman, Mims, & Jespersen (1991).
12adequate proxy.20 The measure used is the citations per faculty taken from Liebowita & Palmer
(1988). The data are normalized as a percent of the level of citations at the University of
Chicago.
The second characteristic is the level of faculty salary. Specifically, we includea dummy variable
which takes a value of one for schools whose faculty salaries are rated "well aboveaverage" based on
the AAUP rating system for their category of institution. This classification is taken fromBarron's
(1990).
Table 5presentsthe resultsfromregressionsofvalueadded and student quality onprogram
characteristics.Sincethedependentvariablesare estimated from a previous stage,weestimate this
regression using weighted least squares. The weight applied to each school is the precision of the
estimate of the dependent variable.21
The results in Table 5 indicate that business networks have a positiveimpact on both value
added and student quality, significant in the case of value added. Whenwe exclude Harvard, then the
marginal effect of business networks more than triples in magnitude. With Harvard excluded, each
additional BW 1000 CEO among a school's alumni is associated with overa $700 increase in our
measure of value added. A standard deviation change in our business network variable (3.8) leadsto
a $2,888 increase in value added, or roughly one half of the standard deviation of value added in the
sample. The impact of business networks on student quality is roughly half the magnitude of its effect
on value added.
Research intensity and high faculty salaries have weak and insignificant impactson value
added, but stronger and more significant effects on student quality. Schools paying high faculty
salaries attract on average students that are over $4,000 better in our qualitymeasure, roughly two-
thirds a standard deviation of student quality in the sample. Similarly, increasing a school's research
20Paul MacAvoy provided us with citation data for eleven of thetop research business schools (see
MacAvoy (1989)). The correlation with the citation data from the same economics departments is 0.66.
21The weight used for the value added regression is VG)" = [(l-h) j½, where &is the estimated
residual variance and ¼is the ith diagonal element of the Hat matrix. The weight used for the student



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 intensity by 17 percentage points (one standard deviation) results in over an $1,800increasein student
quality.
The coefficients on researchintensityand faculty salaries reported in Table 5 must be
interpreted in light of the other variables being held constant. That is, given a program's business
connections, increasing its focus on research andfor moving to the right tail of the faculty salary
distribution does not appear to directly contribute to a program's value added. However, research
intensity and high faculty salaries may still have an important indirect effect by making it possible for
a school to maintain its business network. To investigate this, we estimated the value added
specification dropping the BW 1000 CEOs variable. In this case, the coefficient (standard error) on
research intensity was 75 (44) and on faculty salary was 616 (1.606). Research intensity, then, does
have a positive and marginally significant relationship to value added when we do not control for a
school's existing business network.
We would like to briefly describe the results from some alternative value added and student
quality specifications that we estimated. As an additional control for teaching quality, we included a
variable measuring the percent of classes taught by instructors with Ph.D.'s. This variable was
insignificant in both specifications. We also included an indicator variable which takes the value of
one if a school makes grades available to recruiters. This grade policy had a positive but insignificant
effect on value added, both with Harvard in and out of the sample. In contrast, this grade policy had
a sizeable negative effect on student quality that is robust to including or excluding Harvard. Schools
that provide grade information are estimated to attract students that are on average $2,000 lower in
quality (however the standard error on this estimate is around $1,600). If withholding grades fosters a
cooperative learning environment, then there is weak evidence that this enhances a school's ability
to attract better qualified students.
5.YouPay For What You Receive
The last section of the paper explores the issue of what determines the tuition charged by
MBA programs. If schools compete for MBA students, then tuition should be an increasing function
14of the quality of the program. Better programs should be able to collect higher fees from its students.
If our value added methodology is sensible,thenthe a school's value added should have a stronger
association with its tuition than does its adjusted salary.
Table 6 gives regressions of tuition on adjusted salary and value addedP We include an
indicator variable to control fix the private status of a school. The first column indicates that tuition
fbr business programs in private schools is higher on average by $6,793. It is interesting to note that
this tuition differential remains largely undiminished after we control for either adjusted salary or
value added. We also find no evidence of an interaction between private status and the slope of the
tuition/adjusted salary or the tuition/value added relationship. The second column indicates that each
additional dollar of adjusted starting salary is associated with 14 cents in additional tuition.
We estimate the tuition/value added relationship using instrumental variables. The reason is
that value added is an estimated variable. Measurement error in the estimation process will lead to a
downward biased estimate of its coefficient. To correct for this, we instrument for value added using
the variables reported in Table 5. The results in column three show that each additional dollar of
adjusted salary is associated with 44 cents in additional tuition. At the margin, then, tuition has a
stronger relationship to what a school offers a student in terms of value added than simply adjusted
salary.23
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new methodology for evaluating the performance of MBA
programs. The ranking is based on the performance of each school's graduates in the labor market
for MBAs. A school's performance is judged by its value added rather than its adjusted salary. Our
11We do not have sufficient information on fellowships by school to standardize the tuition amounts.
School's may raise their tuition and also their level of fellowship support in an attempt to price
discriminate in their admissions.
23Using 1985 data, Ehrenberg (1989) finds a similar tuition differential for private law schools
























Number of observations 62 62 62
R-sguare 0.584 0.639 0.284
Notes: Adjustedsalary is the average 1991 starting salary adjusted for each school's cost-of-living.
occupational, and public/private sector placement composition. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. Value added is instrumented using the specification reported in specification (1) of
TableS.top seven business programs all have received praise from other rankings. However,our procedure
doespick out several schools that are not high salary schools, but deserve credit for adding value to
their students. Similarly, several schools with high salaries and high praise in other quarters are poor
performers using our methodology. This reflects the fact that they attract exceptionally high quality
students who do not receive correspondingly high average salaries. This underscores the fact that our
methodology is not simply a relabeling of the underlying starting salary. Further, our results suggest
that the existing widely cited rankings implicitly give substantial weight to the quality of a program's
students, rather than focusing on the quality of the programs themselves.
We extend the earlier debate by attempting to find variables that are correlates of value added.
A school's connections with the business community is a positive force in determining a school's
ranking. In contrast, research intensity and high faculty salaries have a stronger impact on the quality
of a school's students. Finally, we find that the tuition a program can charge has a stronger
connection to the program's value added than to its adjusted salary.
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